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ABSTRACT 
Smoking bans in public places are promoted on the dual basis 
that they protect the public from “secondhand smoke”— 
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), and that bans never harm 
businesses. Evidence shows that ETS does not pose health risks 
nearly as large as many ban advocates claim, and that bans do harm 
some businesses. Unintended and adverse consequences of 
smoking bans include (1) harm to smokers if they compensate by 
smoking more intensely; (2) an increase in drunk driving when 
smokers drive longer distances to smoke and drink; and (3) less 
innovation in air-filtration technology that also slows progress in 
removing hazards other than tobacco smoke. 
The Rationale for Bans 
Public health advocates claim that smoking bans in public places 
are necessary to protect the public from environmental tobacco 
smoke (ETS), often called “secondhand smoke.” Advocates also 
assert that communities can mandate bans without fear that they 
harm any business owners. Advocates go so far as to claim that bans 
often raise profits and so, in effect, owners should thank advocates 
for increasing their wealth. There are two widely cited literature 
reviews that concern economic impacts. 
The first claims that all of the studies that found a negative impact 
were supported by the tobacco industry. While 94 percent of the 
tobacco industry-supported studies reported a negative economic 
impact, none of the non-industry supported studies had this result. 
“All of the best-designed studies report no impact or a positive 
impact of smoke-free restaurant and bar laws on sales or 
employment,” the authors state. “Therefore, policymakers can act to 
protect workers and patrons from the toxins in secondhand smoke 
confident in rejecting industry claims that there will be an adverse 
economic impact.” 
1 
The second article states that it “reviews the spread of clean 
indoor air laws, the effect on public health, and the scientific 
evidence of the economic impact of clean indoor air laws.” It finds 
that the “vast majority of scientific evidence” shows no negative 
economic impact of clean indoor air policies, with “many studies 
finding that there may be some positive effects on local 
businesses,… despite the fact that tobacco industry-sponsored 
research has attempted to create fears to the contrary.” The article 
recognizes the importance of documenting economic impact, 
especially within the hospitality industry, for “further progress in the 
diffusion of clean indoor air laws.” 
2 
The strategy of presenting evidence in two disciplines— 
epidemiology and economics—is used to promote smoking bans. To 
gain support of the nonsmoking public, the risk of ETS, while it may 
exist, is overstated. To overcome resistance of business owners, it is 
repeatedly asserted that bans never harm business, although neither 
theory nor evidence supports this claim. 
Epidemiologic Research on ETS 
Research on ETS does not fully support claims that it poses 
significant health risk. A recent review of the many studies of risks 
associated with ETS exposure concludes that “reported studies do not 
offer consistent results, and overall cannot be interpreted for or against 
3
risk.” Of the 75 published studies of ETS and lung cancer, 70 percent 
did not report statistically significant differences of risk, 17 percent 
claim an increased risk, and 13 percent imply a reduction of risk. 
Michael Siegel summarizes the epidemiologic evidence in the 
following way: 
While there is ample evidence that chronic exposure to 
secondhand smoke increases the risk of cardiovascular 
disease, and therefore heart attack risk, and there is some 
suggestive evidence that acute exposure to secondhand 
smoke may present some danger of risk to individuals with 
existing severe coronary artery disease, there appears to be no 
scientific basis for claims that brief, acute, transient exposure 
to secondhand smoke increases heart attack risk in 
individuals without coronary disease, that it increases such 
risk to the level observed in smokers, that it can cause 
atherosclerosis, that it can cause fatal or catastrophic cardiac 
arrhythmias, or that it represents any other significant acute 
cardiovascular health hazard in nonsmokers. 
4 
Roger Jenkins, noted researcher on composition and 
measurement of ETS smoke, concludes that the typical smoker 
inhales 480 milligrams of smoke, and 32 milligrams of nicotine per 
day. 
5 
In a home where smoking is unrestricted, the typical nonsmoker 
will inhale the equivalent of 0.45 milligrams of smoke particles and 
0.028 milligrams of nicotine. Jenkins also estimates that the average 
nonsmoking woman’s exposure to ETS from living with a smoker 
would be equivalent to 8 to 10 cigarettes’ worth of nicotine and 
particles over the course of a year. 
6 
The harm from ETS is frequently overstated. In 2006, for 
example, the Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) claimed: 
“Breathing drifting tobacco smoke for as little as 30 minutes (less 
than the time one might be exposed sitting on a park bench) can raise 
a non-smoker’s risk of a fatal heart attack to that of a smoker.” 
7 
Siegel 
has counted at least 65 groups making similar claims, including the 
American Cancer Society and the UK National Health Service. 
7 
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Epidemiologist Carl V. Phillips summarizes the case for smoking 
bans, based on evidence regarding public health: 
There is little doubt that inhaling smoke is unhealthy, but 
equally clear evidence shows that we can only demonstrate 
disease risk from ETS for those at the highest level of 
exposure. The evidence about health effects of smoke and the 
legitimate aesthetic objection to involuntary ETS exposure 
are quite sufficient to justify prohibiting indoor smoking in 
public places, though clearly insufficient to justify public 
policies that prohibit voluntary low-level ETS gain. 
8 
This view suggests that the intense dislike of nonsmokers for 
cigarette smoke, and its unhealthy nature provide ample reason to 
ban smoking when nonsmokers cannot easily avoid it. When easily 
avoidable, there are no compelling reasons why voluntary exposure 
would need to be made illegal. It remains puzzling then why ban 
advocates appear to exaggerate epidemiologic evidence when so 
many citizens would support banning smoking in many, but not all 
public places on the basis of aesthetics or accurate risk estimates. 
Perhaps they are less concerned with protecting nonsmokers than 
with eliminating tobacco use everywhere. 
Economic Research on Smoking Bans 
Smoking is commonly viewed as a case of smokers imposing 
negative externalities on nonsmokers, and therefore of failure of 
private markets to allocate resources efficiently. This viewpoint 
singles out smokers as the sole source of the externality, thus leading 
to the conventional solution that smoking should simply be banned. 
The conventional view misses much when it singles out smokers 
as the sole source of the problem. Ronald Coase (1960) introduced 
the notion of “reciprocal nature of externalities” whereby both 
parties—smokers and nonsmokers in this case—believe the other is 
the source of the problem.
9 
Smokers do not like nonsmokers 
complaining about their smoking, and nonsmokers do not like 
smoke. This key insight is critical to understanding that opposing 
parties have incentives to negotiate with each other over disputes. 
Coase argued that, in absence of transaction costs, negotiation 
achieves an efficient solution as long as resources are privately 
owned and transferable. Those who value the airspace the most will 
bid the most for the right to enjoy the airspace as they wish. 
Ban advocates argue that transaction costs are too prohibitive. 
But this is untrue in the hospitality industry because neither party 
owns the air space. Business owners own it, and have financial 
incentives to allocate it efficiently by mediating between smokers 
and nonsmokers. Owners seeking to satisfy highest-valued users 
may forbid smoking, offer smoking/nonsmoking sections, or 
improve air-filtration systems and ventilation. A range of solutions 
will therefore emerge. 
The variety of private solutions has been demonstrated in five 
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peer-reviewed articles. This research demonstrates that owners 
offer more nonsmoking seating and better ventilation when serving 
fewer smoking customers. Some owners voluntarily ban all 
smoking, but others allow smoking throughout, or dedicate areas 
where smoking is not allowed. Thus it is incorrect to argue that 
owners never attempt to resolve smoking disputes. Moreover, it is 
predictable that bans exert different effects on different businesses, 
because customer bases differ: some owners will gain, others will 
lose, and still others will be unaffected. It makes little sense to assert 
that bans never harm, as is often claimed. 
My research with Boyes and Dunham finds that owners with more 
smoking customers predict losses more often than those with few 
smoking customers. Owners are also shown to adjust prices, wages, 
hours of operation, and other business attributes in response to bans; 
thus, bans affect customers and workers. Moreover, bans are mostly 
adopted in communities with fewer smokers, so jurisdictions that ban 
smoking experience less harm than would occur if bans were forced 
on communities with more smokers. Recent evidence of the effects of 
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bans in Scotland, the UK, and India reach similar conclusions. 
Why, then, do so many studies show no harm? Most studies use a 
“community effects” methodology that aggregates all businesses 
within a community into one number and then examines whether this 
number changes following a ban. Studies routinely conclude that 
sales and tax aggregates never fall. This research method is like 
looking at a classroom of 30 students, observing that average weight 
is initially 150 pounds, and concluding that no changes occurred over 
the following 10 years because average weight remained 150 
pounds. Meanwhile, some students gained 20 pounds, some lost 10 
pounds, and still others weigh the same as before. This misleading 
method is routinely employed in studies concluding that bans harm 
no businesses. 
Ban advocates dismiss contrary research as biased, especially 
when funded by the tobacco industry. They do not acknowledge, 
however, that the majority of studies concluding that there is no harm 
are funded by groups with vested interests in finding this result, such 
as the Roswell Park Cancer Institute, the National Cancer Institute, 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers selling nicotine-replacement therapies. 
18 
Unfortunate and Unintended Consequences 
The strategy of distorting the evidence to serve an agenda has 
adverse consequences. 
Smokers compensate in various ways when they are subjected to 
tax hikes. They buy more cigarettes with higher tar and nicotine 
19,20
yields. They may alter the intensity of smoking, defined as the ratio 
of nicotine concentration to the number of cigarettes smoked.
21 
Epidemiologic research shows that more intense smoking is more 
detrimental to health. 
22 
Since bans, in effect, impose a tax rate of infinity 
on consuming in banned locations, bans adversely affect health when 
smokers compensate by smoking more intensely than prior to bans. 
Overstating risk confuses the public about relative risks . 
Fomenting worry about ETS increases the probability of enactment 
of bans, and also promotes more funding for ETS research. Ban 
advocates thus shift focus away from behavior—such as lack of 
exercise, bad diets, or drunk driving—that might pose substantially 
greater health risks. Funds spent on ETS are diverted from research 
that might be more productive. Thus, decreasing the already small 
risk of ETS translates into increasing total health risks. 
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Paradoxically, bans may actually increase smoking. A study of 
bans in Australia finds that they do not significantly reduce smoking 
for most individuals. 
23 
But they may cause a significant “rebellion” 
effect among 18 to 24-year-old smokers, who became more likely to 
continue smoking following bans. A “James Dean” effect on youth 
may therefore exist, whereby bans make it easier to display 
“antisocial” behavior through smoking. 
An increase in fatal car crashes involving drunken drivers has 
been reported after smoking bans are imposed in bars. 
24 
Such 
evidence is consistent with the explanation that bans cause smokers 
to drive longer distances to get to bars in another jurisdiction where 
they may continue to smoke. 
Ironically, smoking bans may impede efforts to improve air 
quality. Several leading advocates are alarmed that improved 
ventilation could undermine passage of bans. 
25 
Better ventilation and 
air filtration could remove both ETS and other irritants and toxins, 
such as wood smoke, cooking oil, and insecticides. But, because of 
the singular focus on tobacco smoke, incentives for technologies that 
improve overall air quality surely decrease following bans. 
Overstatement fosters suspicion that epidemiologic research and 
economic research are fast becoming junk science. Overzealous 
advocacy for smoking bans serves to discredit fields of research that 
can improve our lives in many ways. Phillips writes: 
The activists involved, many of whom hold titles that 
indicate that they should behave as scientists and academics, 
appear unconcerned about subverting science to further their 
worldly agendas, hurting the careers of honest scientists, 
driving students away from politically controversial fields, 
attacking the principles of free academic research, and 
threatening the reputation of epidemiology as a field. 
8 
Conclusions 
To achieve a political goal, advocates of smoking bans may 
exaggerate the risk of ETS and deny evidence of economic harm to 
some businesses. Distorted presentation of epidemiologic and 
economic evidence has the adverse effect of increasing total health 
risk, and of undermining the integrity of science. 
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